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Abstract 
 
This study extends the standard econometric treatment 
of appellate court outcomes by 1) considering the role of 
decision-maker effort and case complexity, and 2) 
adopting a multi-categorical selection process of 
appealed cases. We find evidence of appellate courts 
being affected by both the effort made by first-stage 
decision makers and case complexity. This illustrates the 
value of widening the narrowly defined focus on 
heterogeneity in individual-specific preferences that 
characterises many applied studies on legal decision-
making. Further, the majority of appealed cases 
represent non-random sub-samples and the multi-
categorical selection process appears to offer advantages 
over the more commonly used dichotomous selection 
models.  
 
JEL classification: K41, C34 
Keywords: Appeal, Decision-maker effort, Case complexity, Selection bias. 
 
 
Miguel Santolino. RFA Research Group-IREA. Department of Econometrics. University of 
Barcelona, Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain.  
E-mail: msantolino@ub.edu 
 
 
Magnus Söderberg. Dep CERNA, Mines ParisTech60. Boulevard St Michel, 75006 Paris, France.  
E-mail: magnus.soderberg@handels.gu.se 
 
 
 3
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                           Document de Treball   2011/15  pàg. 4 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                           Working Paper             2011/15   pag. 4 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many legal systems are structured hierarchically whereby decisions made by the courts of first 
instance (e.g. bureaucratic agencies and trial courts) can be appealed to higher instances. 
Decisions made by appellate courts are valuable to market agents since they increase “outcome 
predictability” and reduce review time through the setting of precedents.1 Their value for policy 
makers include 1) a performance assessment of the lower instances, which may serve a self-
regulatory purpose and/or as the basis for an active benchmarking programme aimed at 
increasing court productivity,2 and 2) insights into how the design of the appellate process can be 
adjusted to reduce errors by the courts of first instance. Hence, the ability to identify the way in 
which appellate courts might respond to specific case and environmental characteristics can have 
substantial welfare implications.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the standard econometric treatment of appellate court 
outcomes in two directions. First, when evaluating what factors affect these outcomes we include 
two characteristics of the decision-maker and the case that have not, or only sporadically, 
received empirical attention so far. This extension investigates the value of looking beyond the 
ideological heterogeneity between the courts of first instance and the appellate courts that has 
been the focus in many similar studies. Second, we use an analytical framework based on a 
general classification of appeals that allows each agent (or combination of agents) to have distinct 
appeal functions, and the appeals court to respond uniquely to each group of appeals. This is a 
more flexible framework than the dichotomous classification of cases in ‘appeal’/’no appeal’ 
typically found in the literature. In the rest of this section we review these two extensions in more 
detail.  
 
The standard assumption is that judicial decisions are primarily determined by the law and by the 
heterogeneity that exists between judicial levels in ideological and private preferences.3 While the 
law has been argued to have the largest impact on judicial outcomes (e.g. Cross, 2007), empirical 
legal studies in the past have placed considerable emphasis on decision-makers’ ideology/private 
preferences.4 Authors have expressed concern for the relative neglect of the possible role played 
by other factors (e.g. Czarnezki, 2008). In this study we evaluate the role of decision-maker effort 
                                                 
1 As outlined below, uncertainty and number of precedents can be positively correlated when precedents 
are in conflict with each other. See Di Vita (2010) for a discussion on the value of a short review time.  
2 See Schneider (2005) for an example applied to German civil law courts.  
3 Guthrie and George (2005) provide an overview of the theories explaining judicial decision-making.    
4 See Eisenberg and Heise (2009), Yates and Coggins (2009), Candeub and Brown (2008), de Figueiredo 
(2005), Haire et al. (2003), Clermont and Eisenberg (2001) and Spitzer and Talley (1998) for examples of 
studies primarily based on decision-makers’ ideology. Many of these confirm that ideological heterogeneity 
provides a significant explanation of judicial outcomes.  
 4
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                           Document de Treball   2011/15  pàg. 5 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                           Working Paper             2011/15   pag. 5 
 
 
and case complexity, both of which are related to decision quality.5 To the best of our knowledge, 
decision-maker effort has never previously been considered in any empirical legal study.  
 
In contrast to effort, case complexity has been subject to previous empirical investigation. Kaheny 
et al. (2008) have claimed that complexity and decision variability are positively related. However, 
we argue that using the number of document pages as a proxy for complexity, as these authors 
do, is not a universally valid proxy. Different writers use different writing styles and background 
information included in judicial decisions is sometimes merely copied from earlier cases. Clermont 
and Eisenberg (2002) use review time as a proxy for complexity but as we show in this study 
there are several factors unrelated to complexity that can have a significant impact on review 
time. Hence, both these measures appear to be questionable proxies for complexity as well as 
raising concerns about endogeneity.  
 
The second purpose of this study is to review available methods for the correction of non-random 
samples. Non-randomness occurs when unobserved factors influence both the litigants’ decisions 
to appeal and the decisions made by the appellate courts. Givati (2010) illustrates the problem by 
highlighting the consequences of a court of first instance changing its degree of aggressiveness. 
When this court shifts to a safe (risky) strategy, it reduces (increases) the number of cases being 
appealed. When this move is unobserved, or ignored by the analyst, it will bias the estimates. 
Other reasons as to why non-random cases might occur are asymmetric information and 
divergent expectations among litigants (Seabury, 2009).6 Kastellec and Lax (2008) use Supreme 
Court decisions and show through simulation analysis that inferences can be substantially biased 
when non-random appellate selection is ignored.  
 
An increasing number of empirical studies have identified non-randomness in the sample handled 
by appellate courts (e.g. Söderberg, 2008; de Figueiredo, 2005; Clermont and Eisenberg, 2002). 
The standard approach in the law and economics discipline when controlling for selection is to 
use a dichotomous selection mechanism that treats all appeals as originating from the same 
probability process. While that can be appropriate in some instances,7 it should be clear that this 
is typically a special case as all disputing agents normally have the right to appeal. Hence, the 
                                                 
5 Similar claims have been made in the theoretical literature. For example, Shavell (2004) and Siegelman 
and Donohue III (1990) argue that complexity and the likelihood of litigation are positively correlated.  The 
positive relationship between decision quality and affirmance rate has been established empirically by Nash 
and Pardo (2008). 
6 Siegelman and Donohue III (1990) argue that another source of non-random selection in empirical legal 
studies is when a decision may be either published or unpublished, making the published sub-sample 
potentially non-random.   
7 E.g. de Figueiredo (2005) considers a context where only one agent can appeal the decision made by the 
court of first instance. 
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multi-categorical selection mechanism is a more flexible and often more appropriate 
representation of the selection mechanism for legal disputes. Further, a priori it is unreasonable to 
assume that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s decisions to appeal are statistically identical. Our 
purpose is to demonstrate the importance of correcting for non-random case selection in general, 
and the value of a multi-categorical selection principle in particular. We are unaware of any legal 
study using a multi-categorical selection mechanism to analyse appealed rulings.  
 
We draw on two diverse legal data sets to illustrate the benefits of our suggestions. First we look 
at regulatory disputes in the Swedish electricity sector where customers have filed complaints 
about monopoly conditions to a sectoral regulator. Some of the decisions made by the regulator 
have subsequently been appealed to the first administrative court of appeals (the County 
Administrative Court). The second data set represents motor car injury claims in Spain. These 
disputes are first dealt with by a trial court and, in case the plaintiff or the defendant decides to 
appeal, by the appellate court. 
 
When looking at disputes in the Swedish electricity distribution market we investigate the role of 
both effort and complexity. We claim that effort and review time are positively correlated, which is 
consistent with Prendergast’s (2003) suggestion that the longer a case is investigated, the higher 
the quality of the decision.8 By using review time as the dependent variable and controlling for all 
other factors that have a structural influence on review time, we can proxy effort by the resulting 
residuals. The number of precedents is used as a proxy for decision complexity. As the number of 
precedents is unambiguously exogenous in relation to the present case, and since all precedents 
must be considered by the regulator and the court, it provides a more straightforward econometric 
solution and is a more objective measure than both number of pages and review time. Following 
Fon and Parisi (2006), we would expect a rich availability of precedents to create more complexity 
for a technically oriented regulator than it would for a court. This is particularly true when, as in our 
case, there is a large degree of divergence in precedents.  
 
The second data set looks at motor car injury disputes in Spain. The focus here is on case 
complexity. The relatively high degree of complexity in Spanish motor car law is due to the 
subjective nature of financial compensation. The court’s ruling is typically made in a different year 
to that in which the motor accident occurred. The courts interpret the rules for how financial 
compensation ought to be updated differently. The system used in updating compensation, which 
influences the likelihood of receiving a favourable decision, is used as a proxy for decision 
                                                 
8 Schneider (2005) finds empirical support for a positive relationship between productivity and rate of 
reversal, which can be interpreted as shorter review times lead to decisions of lower quality. 
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complexity. Discrepancies between the legal medical evaluation and the court’s decision on how 
to calculate interest further add to this complexity. The effect on the appeal process of these 
complexity proxies is especially relevant because these factors may be regulated by policy 
makers.  
 
Foreshadowing our main results, we find evidence of appellate courts being affected by the effort 
made by first-stage decision makers and case complexity. Consistent with our hypothesis, this 
illustrates the value of widening the narrowly defined focus on heterogeneity in individual-specific 
preferences that still characterises many applied studies on legal decision-making. Further, the 
majority of appealed cases represent non-random sub-samples and the multi-categorical 
selection mechanism appears to have advantages over the commonly used dichotomous 
selection models.  
 
The paper proceeds with a section on the methodological details of obtaining unbiased estimates 
at the appeal stage when the available sample is potentially non-random. Section 3 looks at 
regulatory decision-making in the Swedish electricity sector and Section 4 contains an analysis of 
motor car injuries in Spain. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Principles of selection 
 
Formally, sample selection may be interpreted as an identification problem in which outcomes are 
only partially observed (Manski, 1995). Owing to sample bias, least squares (LS) regression leads 
to inconsistent parameter estimates. To avoid this inconsistency, a sample selection correction is 
required. However, given that there are many different selection generating possibilities available, 
correction mechanisms must be designed to reflect the true process. Since Heckman’s (1976) 
pioneering work, the sample selection problem has been extensively studied in the literature (see, 
for example, Heckman, 1979; Winship and Mare, 1992; Lee and Marsh, 2000).9 Most of the 
attention has focused on sample selection mechanisms based on binary dependent variables 
which are parametrically modelled by a probit or logit specification. When selection is generated 
over a number of choices greater than two, the multinominal logit model has been proposed as an 
interesting alternative at the selection stage. Studies in the literature following this approach 
include Lee (1983), Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Dahl (2002).  
 
 
                                                 
9 For a review of selection models see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Greene (2003)  
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Dichotomous selection  
Let  be the appeal court financial ruling which is the outcome of interest. This appeal court 
judgement is observed only if , where 
y
* 0y  *y  reflects the decision to appeal the decision made 
in the court of first instance. In our applications the first instance judgement relates to the 
regulator decision or trial court verdict, respectively. The model is specified as follows: 
 
* '
'
i i
i i
y z u
y x
 i
i 
 
    (1) 
   
for the i-th individual, i=1…N, where  and iz ix  are the vectors of regressors and   and   are 
the vectors of parameters. The errors  and iu i  are normally distributed with variance 2u   and 
2
 , and covariance 12 .  is a latent variable. The observed variable *y I  is related to  
according to: 
*y
*
*
1 if 0
0 if 0
i
i
i
y
I
y
   
, 
 
where iI  takes value 1 when the i-th judgement made in first instance is appealed by litigants and 
zero if not. Heckman (1976) suggested a two-step procedure to estimate the parameters. First   
is estimated by probit regression of I on z. The Heckman-type lambda H  is then computed to 
account for non-random sampling bias: 
 
'
12
'    
H
i i i i
H
i i
y x
x  i
   
   
  
    (2) 
 
such that ' ˆ( ) / ( )Hi i iz z
' ˆ     , where (·)  and (·)  are the standard normal density and 
distribution functions. Sample selection occurs when the correlation between errors is not null, 
where the correlation is 12 / u     .  Parameters in (2) are estimated by LS techniques. 
Because of heteroscedastiticy and   replacement by estimates, LS standard errors cannot be 
directly used as an estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix. Heckman (1979) and Greene 
(1981) provide an asymptotic covariance matrix estimate which accounts for these characteristics. 
Parameters could also be estimated by maximum likelihood (ML), which increases the efficiency. 
However, additional (and testable) assumptions about the joint distribution of errors are required 
to go from the two-step estimation to the ML estimation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Additionally, 
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the two-step Heckman procedure facilitates model comparisons since Lee’s model is only 
available as a two-step procedure.  
 
Multi-categorical selection 
Now consider the case when sample selection is based on J exclusive choices, where J>2. Lee 
(1983) proposed a generalization of the Heckman two-step estimator. In an analogous form to the 
dichotomous selection, the model is specified as follows: 
 
* '
'
        1,...,
    
ji i j ji
i i i
y z u j
y x

 
  
 
J
 (3) 
where  is observed if .  are latent variables. The observed variableiy
*
1 j 1
> max ( )iy y
*
ji
* 'y s iD  
consists of J categories, where  if 1iD  1 0i   such that . * *1 j 1max ( )i jiy y   1i ' s  are estimated 
by a multinomial logit regression model, where the probability of the category k is: 
'
'
1
exp(  )( )        1 .
exp( )
i k
k i J
i j
j
zP P D k k J
z



    

 
Given  1 2, ,...,i i i i Jz z z    , Lee (1983) showed that a consistent estimator of  is obtained 
when the following regression is estimated by least squares:  
 
 1
1
'
1
'
1
'
1
( )
[ ( (0 | ))]
     
(0 | )
     
i i i i
i
i
i
L
i i i
y x w
F
ix wF
x w




 
  
   

   
   
  
 (4) 
 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of 
1
(·| )F  1  and 1  the correlation between ε and 
 The estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix is obtained in an analogous 
way to that in the Heckman procedure (Lee, 1983). Lee’s sample selection correction relies on 
linearity assumptions over the form of 
1 1
( | )). 1(F 
( )  . Restrictions over ( )   are required to make it 
statistically tractable. Alternative multi-categorical sample selection corrections suggested in the 
literature vary depending on the restrictions imposed on ( )  . The Lee approach involves the 
estimation of fewer parameters at the cost of flexibility. Therefore this method is especially 
appropriate for small sample sizes, as in our applications.10  
                                                 
10 See Bourguignon et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion of selection models involving multi-categorical 
selection mechanisms. The other correction methods outlined by Bourguignon et al. (2007) were also 
evaluated but Lee’s method showed the best results, which supports the argument that Lee’s method is 
preferred for small samples.   
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3. The appeals process in the Swedish electricity market 
 
In the Swedish electricity distribution sector, customers can file complaints to the regulator about 
the contract conditions determined by monopolistic utilities. Based on its investigations, the 
regulator either confirms the conditions in full or withholds a proportion of the utility’s ‘benefits’ – 
e.g., the price if the case concerns a monetary transfer. Either the customer or the utility can 
appeal the regulator’s decision to the County Administrative Court (CAC).11 Here, we focus solely 
on connection disputes that arise when customers complain about the price quoted by utilities for 
establishing a new connection to the existing network. Focusing on one type of dispute eliminates 
the need to consider case heterogeneity.   
 
The effort made by each regulatory decision-maker is unobserved and has to be proxied. As a 
starting point, we work on the understanding that, ceteris paribus, a greater amount of effort 
requires a longer review. Thus, we propose that a regulatory decision-maker’s efforts be proxied 
with the residuals of a function where the review time (RRevTi) is the dependent variable and 
workload, decision complexity, decision-maker experience, utility size and ownership, and 
decision-maker fixed effects are the independent variables. However, Lax and Cameron (2007) 
have suggested that workload might also have a direct effect on effort since decision-makers 
might respond to higher workload by conducting quicker, less thorough investigations. Thus, to 
circumvent this endogeneity problem we replace workload with a variable representing the 
number of days since the Swedish electricity market was deregulated (Days) and a dummy for 
cases representing connection of mobile antennas (Ant). Workload has increased steadily during 
the period of deregulation, while the connection of mobile antennas is more readily reviewed due 
to a relatively high degree of standardisation.12 Decision complexity is given by the total number 
of precedents that has to be considered for each decision (NoPrec). A precedent is defined as a 
case decided by the CAC in the past that falls into the same category as the present case. ThreeL 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the utility is one of the three largest and UtiPri is a 
dummy that equals 1 when the utility is privately owned. Both ThreeL and UtiPri control for utility 
heterogeneity, such as financial and legal strength, which has been claimed to influence appellate 
court decisions (Kaheny et al., 2008). DM1 and DM2 are used to control for decision-makers’ 
time-invariant characteristics, such as their inclination to engage in strategic behaviour.13 With 
these variables, the specification can be formulated as: 
                                                 
11 Further details of the regulatory dispute process in the Swedish electricity sector can be found in Smyth 
and Söderberg (2010).   
12 We also evaluated the model with workload included as a regressor (calculated as the number of 
decisions made during the previous 12 months), and found the same qualitative results.  
13 See Levy (2005) for discussion and theoretical justification. 
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RRevTi = α0 + α1Days + α2Ant + α3Days×Ant + α4NoPrec + α5ThreeL + α6UtiPri +  
 α7DM1 + α8DM2 + η  (5) 
 
Using the LS estimator we obtain the residuals ˆ  which are used to represent decision-makers’ 
effort. The output of eq. (5) is displayed in the Appendix (Table A2) and is not discussed further 
here since the α-parameters only serve the purpose of identifying ˆ  in this particular application. 
The descriptive statistics for all the equations in this section are also provided in the Appendix 
(Table A1).   
 
It is hypothesised that the litigant’s probability of appealing is affected by whether the regulator’s 
decision contains error(s), the amount withheld by the regulator, and the litigant’s budget 
constraints. Privately owned (i.e. profit-maximising) utilities might have financial incentives that 
differ from those of their publicly owned counterparts and a customer formed as a corporation will 
face a lower cost of litigation than that faced by a private person. Hence, the first two variables we 
consider in the appeal function are UtPri and CustC, where CustC indicates whether the customer 
is a corporation. To capture the deviation between the regulator’s assessment and a utility’s initial 
claim, we create a variable of the ratio between the amount awarded by the regulator Pr and the 
amount charged by the utility, Pu. The hypothesis is that customers are more inclined to appeal 
for high levels of Pr/Pu, whereas the opposite holds for the utilities. Violation of the customer’s 
budget constraints is included through the length of the low voltage line required to connect the 
customer (LengL). This is very closely related to the total cost of the connection.  
 
When specifying the CAC’s decision, we begin by creating the dependent variable as the ratio 
between the amount awarded by the court and that awarded by the regulator (Pc/Pr). Dividing the 
court’s award by the regulator’s eliminates the influence of any basic cost drivers such as 
transformers and high/low voltage line lengths for which the regulator and court have long since 
established templates that are widely accepted by the agents involved. The court’s review time 
(CRevTi) is used to collectively represent the factors included in eq. (5). A similar analysis to that 
involved in eq. (5) cannot be performed for the court due to lack of data. NoPrec is used to 
investigate how the regulator responds to increased complexity. The inclusion of ThreeL, DM1 
and DM2 can be justified on the same grounds as presented above. Decision-makers’ experience 
and their exposure to litigant and court behaviour are accounted for by including NoDec – the total 
number of regulatory decisions they have made. Using Heckman’s model, the equations that 
determine the relative amount awarded by the court can then be expressed as: 
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AppeCu = γ0 + γ1UtPriv + γ2CustC + γ3ˆ  + γ4NoPrec + γ5(Pr/Pu) + γ6LengL - u  (6)   
  
Pc/Pr = β0 + β1ˆ  + β2CRevTi + β3NoPrec + β4ThreeL + β5DM1 + β6DM2 +  
β7NoDec - H  +v   (7) 
 
where AppeCu takes the value 1 when a case is appealed by a customer and 0 otherwise. When 
investigating how the court treats cases appealed by utilities, we create a new dependent 
variable, AppeUt that takes the value 1 only when utilities appeal and 0 otherwise. Similar 
reasoning applies for when both customers and utilities appeal (AppeBo).  
 
However, the dichotomous selection mechanism used in Heckman’s model ignores the multi-
categorical nature of the appeals process. A less restrictive specification would allow the 
regulatory decisions to be classified in four categories: 1) customer appeals, 2) utility appeals, 3) 
both customer and utility appeals, and 4) no appeals from either party. Such an approach 
suggests the appropriateness of using Lee’s model. An objection to using Lee’s model, however, 
is that outcome 4 may be correlated with outcomes 2 and 3, which would invalidate the 
assumption of independent outcomes that the multinomial logit model rests on. Nevertheless, 
Monte-Carlo simulations have shown that selection mechanisms based on the multinomial logit 
perform well even when the assumption of independent categories is violated (Bourguignon et al., 
2007). When Lee’s method of correction is used and regulatory decisions are classified into these 
four categories using AppeCat as the dependent variable, eqs. (6) and (7) can be modified 
according to:  
 
AppeCat = γ0 + γ1UtPriv + γ2CustC + γ3ˆ  + γ4NoPrec + γ5(Pr/Pu) + γ6LengL + u1    (8) 
  
Pc/Pr = β0 + β1ˆ  + β2CRevTi + β3NoPrec + β4ThreeL + β5DM1 + β6DM2 +  
β7NoDec - 1 L   +w  (9) 
 
Depending on the regulator’s specific objective one can form different expectations about γ3, γ4, 
β1 and β3 in eqs. (6)-(9). If the regulator is truth-seeking and unbiased, increased effort will reduce 
the probability of appeals and lead to the hypothesis that γ3<0. If the regulator’s preferences are 
biased in favour of the customers, as suggested by Smyth and Söderberg (2010), we would 
expect γ3<0 when the customers appeal and γ3>0 when the utilities do so. Greater complexity 
increases the opportunity for each litigant to promote their own private preferences (leading to 
γ4>0), but if the litigants suffer from a shortage of information relative to the regulator, γ4<0 is 
 12
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                           Document de Treball   2011/15  pàg. 13 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                           Working Paper             2011/15   pag. 13 
 
 
expected. The net effect of these forces is therefore ambiguous. If the regulator is unbiased, β1 
and β3 will drive Pc/Pr towards 1. If the regulator is pro-consumer, β1 and β3 will be >0.  
 
Estimations of eqs. (6) and (7) are shown in the first three columns of Table 1, and eqs. (8) and 
(9) are presented in the last three columns. As indicated, both Heckman’s and Lee’s models show 
that the error covariance is significant when customers or utilities appeal, which suggests that the 
vast majority of cases handled by the CAC are drawn from non-random processes of disputes. A 
comparison of the two models shows that greater explanatory power and consistently lower AIC-
values are provided by Lee’s more flexible model. While informative, these measures are not 
entirely conclusive since they do not account for the fact that the first stage coefficients are 
estimates. However, the statistical results for a number of individual parameters also differ 
between the two models. Thus, overall it would seem that Lee’s model offers advantages over 
Heckman’s more restrictive model in this case. Consequently, we focus on Lee’s model, and in 
particular on how γ3, γ4, β1 and β3 influence the appeal process, when giving more detailed 
comments on the empirical outcome.  
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Table 1. Estimation output for eqs. (6)-(9).    
 Heckman’s model Lee’s model † 
 Customer 
appeals 
Utility appeals Both appeal Customer 
appeals 
Utility appeals Both appeal 
Variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 
Stage 1 (Appeals)              
UtPri -0.3647 
(0.2768) 
 0.0344
(0.1547)
 -0.5946
(0.1950)
***  -1.4381
(0.5690)
** -0.8189 
(0.3247) 
** -1.7286
(0.4256)
***
CustC 2.2481 
(0.7809) 
*** 0.0998
(0.1841)
 1.4942
(0.4290)
***  4.7413
(1.8175)
*** 1.0842 
(0.3430) 
*** 3.3434
(0.8441)
***
ˆ  6.3×10-4 
(8.9×10-4) 
 0.0011
(4.6×10-4)
** -3.6×10-4
(5.5×10-4)
  0.0020
(0.0019)
 0.0019 
(9.4×10-4) 
** 4.5×10-5
(0.0012)
 
NoPrec -0.0217 
(0.0154) 
 -0.0201
(0.0062)
*** 0.0048
(0.0064)
  -0.0503
(0.0290)
* -0.0407 
(0.0115) 
*** -0.0104
(0.0151)
 
Pr/Pu 4.8451 
(0.7484) 
*** -1.6244
(0.3233)
*** -1.0450
(0.3928)
***  9.6175
(2.1686)
*** -2.8074 
(0.7276) 
*** -2.6702
(0.9145)
***
LengL 8.6×10-4 
(4.2×10-4) 
** -2.6×10-4
(3.1×10-4)
 -2.4×10-4
(4.1×10-4)
  0.0014
(9.0×10-4)
 1.2×10-5 
(6.6×10-4) 
 5.0×10-5
(9.0×10-4)
 
Constant -6.8418 
(1.1925) 
*** 1.3741
(0.3542)
*** -1.3504
(0.5617)
**  -11.863
(2.8625)
*** 3.1829 
(0.7318) 
*** -0.1943 
(1.2020)
 
            
Stage 2 (CAC 
decisions) 
           
ˆ  6.7×10-5 
(1.5×10-4) 
 4.6×10-4
(1.8×10-4)
*** -2.6×10-4
(2.9×10-4)
  7.5×10
-5
(1.5×10-4)
 4.0×10-4 
(1.8×10-4) 
** -2.1×10-4
(3.0×10-4)
 
CRevTi -4.8×10-4 
(2.4×10-4) 
** 2.3×10-5
(2.6×10-4)
 8.6×10-4
(3.7×10-4)
**  -4.5×10
-4
(2.4×10-4)
* 2.5×10-4 
(2.6×10-4) 
 9.6×10-4
(4.0×10-4)
** 
NoPrec 0.0082 
(0.0031) 
*** 0.0079
(0.0047)
* 0.0027
(0.0051)
  0.0080 
(0.0033)
** 0.0094 
(0.0047) 
** 0.0037
(0.0058)
 
ThreeL -0.1356 
(0.0434) 
*** 0.0208
(0.0513)
 0.0513
(0.0788)
  -0.1199
(0.0453)
*** 0.0225 
(0.0509) 
 0.0834
(0.0959)
 
DM1 -0.2963 
(0.0941) 
*** -0.0899
(0.0980)
 0.0583
(0.1043)
  -0.2872
(0.0987)
*** -0.0906 
(0.0976) 
 0.0542
(0.1070)
 
DM2 -0.2619 
(0.0976) 
*** -0.0225
(0.1245)
 -   -0.2485
(0.1025)
** -0.0060 
(0.1234) 
 -  
NoDec 2.3×10-5 
(3.6×10-4) 
 8.2×10-4
(4.9×10-4)
* 2.4×10-4
(4.9×10-4)
  4.7×10
-5
(3.7×10-4)
 7.7×10-4 
(4.9×10-4) 
 4.8×10-5
5.6×10-4
 
Constant 1.3426 
(0.1134) 
*** 0.9943
(0.1482)
*** 0.9203
(0.1865)
***  1.3168
(0.1179)
*** 1.0256 
(0.1486) 
*** 0.9422
(0.2010)
***
            
Lambda -0.1354 
(0.0320) 
*** -0.2220
(0.1153)
* -0.2367
(0.1555)
  -0.1470
(0.0397)
*** -0.3193 
(0.1325) 
** -0.2986
(0.1957)
 
            
R2 0.487  0.331  0.149   0.512 0.341  0.152
AIC -4.238  -2.452  -3.078   -4.290 -2.467  -3.0818
N1=337 (sample size in first stage). 
N2=41 (sample size in second stage when customers appeal); N2=132 (sample size in second stage when utilities appeal); 
N2=60 (sample size in second stage when both customers and utilities appeal). 
Notes: † Base category: neither party appeals. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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γ3 is positive and significant when utilities appeal and insignificant when customers appeal, which 
suggests that the regulator is pro-consumer. γ4 is negative for all types of appeal, which suggests 
that the regulator’s use of precedents universally reduces the likelihood of appeals. Based on the 
above reasoning, this outcome is consistent with litigants having limited access to information 
relative to the regulator.  
 
β1 is positive when both customers and utilities appeal. When the regulator puts in the least effort 
(see descriptive statistics in Table A1) the court will increase the amount the utility is allowed to 
charge by 55%. When the regulator puts in the most effort the court increases the amount by 
70%. Hence, the CAC’s response to the regulator’s efforts provides further evidence of the 
regulator being pro-consumer. Finally, β3 is positive and significant when both the customers and 
utilities appeal (at least at the 10 % level) which supports the notion that the regulator overly 
depreciates precedents in favour of utilities. As the point estimates are almost identical, there is 
no evidence that the regulator is unable to assess many and contradictory precedents as 
suggested by Fon and Parisi (2006).     
 
 
4. The appeals process in the Swedish electricity market 
 
Spain’s motor vehicle law is an at-fault system in which victims not responsible for an accident are 
entitled to financial compensation for injuries incurred. Moreover, third-party insurance is 
compulsory, which means that disputing agents normally bring claims against the insurance 
companies of at-fault drivers. Financial compensation for personal injuries is assessed according 
to a scheduled scale. Reducing uncertainty over such amounts, and hence also the probability for 
instigating litigation, was stated as being one of the main objectives for the introduction of this 
system in 1995. However, around 10% of cases are still heard before a trial court (first instance), 
and a substantial proportion of first instance verdicts are taken on appeal to higher instances 
(Santolino, 2010).   
 
We examine 202 motor bodily injury disputes settled by judicial decision in 2002 and 2003 of 
which 145 were resolved in first instance14 and 57 by the appeal court. Both parties are entitled to 
appeal the first instance judgement and 32 rulings were appealed by the victim and 25 by the 
insurer. The appeal is a two-stage decision process in which agents first decide whether to bring a 
subsequent appeal against the court of first instance’s ruling. Santolino (2010) focused on this first 
                                                 
14 Litigants explicitly renounce proceeding with the judicial process and bringing an appeal before a higher 
court. 
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stage and investigated the determinants of an agent’s decision to appeal. In this study we go one 
step further in the modelling of the appeal process and include the appeal court’s performance at 
the second stage. This performance is measured as ln(CA/CT), where CA is the compensation 
awarded by the appeal court and CT the damages previously awarded by the trial court. Natural 
logarithms are taken to reduce data dispersion. 
 
We investigate the effect of four factors on the judgement made by the appeal court when the 
claimant brings an appeal against the trial court’s decision.15 These factors each reflect the 
complexity of Spain’s compensation system for personal injuries incurred in motor accidents. A 
source of disputes between claimant and insurer is that of fault allocation. We capture 
discrepancies in accident responsibility using the variable Fault, which takes the value 1 when the 
insurer has some doubts as to whether the insured driver was fully responsible for the accident. It 
is difficult to determine a priori whether the percentage of fault allocated by the trial court is 
revised by the appeal court. Therefore, the effect of this variable on the performance of the appeal 
court is unclear. The variable Sever computes the difference in the severity of the injury as 
identified in the ruling and that stated by the forensic doctor. Severity of injuries is evaluated by 
means of a disability scoring scale, which identifies a range of injuries and fixes a maximum-
minimum score for each.16 Disputes may well arise over the severity of injury, as financial 
compensation for injuries are awarded on the basis of this disability score. Although the forensic 
report is not binding, it is expected that the appeal court will take it into consideration and revise 
the degree of severity as assessed by the trial court if the latter score does not match that 
reported by the expert.  
 
The variable System identifies the compensation system that is to be applied in the event that the 
year in which the accident occurred and the year in which the claim is heard differ. In practise, this 
is often the case given the time needed for a victim to recover following a traffic accident and the 
duration of legal proceedings. When it occurs there are two approaches to determining which 
compensation system applies. Some legal experts consider compensation to be a debt of wealth 
and that, therefore, the system in force at the time of the trial should be applied so as to maintain 
wealth equivalent over time. Others hold that compensation is a debt of money and as such the 
system in force at the time of the accident should be applied, since it already includes procedures 
for updating the value of money. This discussion is of relevance because significantly higher 
amounts are obtained when the system in force at the time of the trial is employed. The variable 
System takes the value 1 if the compensation system applied was that in force at the time of the 
                                                 
15 A similar analysis was made for insurers but owing to the limited sample size, no appeal results were 
obtained.  
16 See Boucher and Santolino (2010) for further details on this scale. 
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accident. Finally, the variable Inter indicates whether the insurer is not charged interest for 
delaying payment. These factors reflect various elements of complexity in the sense that there is 
more than one assessment practice, and the option chosen depends largely on the presiding 
judge. The assessment practice selected will always be advantageous to one party or the other. 
However, it is not easy to hypothesize how this complexity might affect the behaviour of the 
appeal court. 
 
Two further variables are included in the selection regressions. The compensation awarded by the 
trial court CT is included to analyze the effect of the amount of damages on the appeal decision. 
This variable was dropped in the second stage in order to avoid endogeneity. The variable Time 
records the number of years that elapse from the date of the accident to the trial court making its 
ruling so as to capture the agents’ budget constraints. Descriptive statistics of all the variables are 
shown in Table A3. The Heckman model can be defined as, 
 
         AppeVic = γ0 + γ1Fault + γ 2Time + γ3Sever + γ4System + γ5CT + γ6Inter - u     
          ln(CA/CT) = β0 + β1Fault + β2Sever+ β3System + β4Inter - H  +v            (7) 
 
where the variable AppeVic takes the value 1 when the victim brought an appeal against the 
ruling of the court of first instance and 0 if not. The Heckman-type selection brings together those 
decisions against which an appeal was brought by the insurer and those against which no appeal 
was lodged. However, unlike Heckman’s model, Lee’s model can take into account the 
multinomial nature of the dependent variable as follows:  
 
          Appeal = γ0 + γ1Fault + γ2Time + γ  3Sever + γ4System + γ  5 CT + γ6Inter + u1     
tem +           ln(CA/CT) = β0 + β1Fault + β2Sever+ β3Sys  β4Inter - 1 L   +w                   
) 
hree categories: 1) if the victim appeals, 2) if the insurer 
ppeals and 3) if neither party appeals. 
specification, however, captures the multi-categorical nature of the selection mechanism better as 
(8
 
where the variable Appeal consists of t
a
 
It is important to select the adequate model specification because notable differences are 
observed between the two models’ estimates (Table 2). Lee’s model seems preferable based on 
the goodness-of-fit measures (R2 and AIC-value). What is more, the covariance estimate is not 
significant in Heckman’s specification. As such, Heckman’s model is not sufficiently justified 
against the regression model without selection and further analysis is required. Lee’s 
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is indicated by the significance of the covariance estimate. In conclusion, Lee’s model seems to 
provide a more adequate fit to these data. 
 
Table 2. Performance of Spain’s appeal court with correction for non-random sampling    
 Heckman's 
model 
Lee's model † 
 Victim appeals Victim appeals Insurer appeals 
Variable Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 Coeff. 
(SE) 
 
Stage1       
Fault -1.1274
(0.5294)
** -1.8739
(0.9483)
** 0.7938 
(0.5838) 
 
Time -0.2708
(0.1868)
 -0.4773
(0.3358)
 0.0383 
(0.2024) 
 
Sever -0.1025
(0.0402)
** -0.1742
(0.0701)
** 0.0432 
(0.0607) 
 
System 0.1688 
(0.3114)
 0.1441
(0.5008)
 -1.1348 
(0.4971) 
** 
Comp -0.0333
(0.0151)
** -0.0575
(0.0280)
** 0.0006 
(0.0169) 
 
Inter 1.8569
(0.3586)
*** 3.1283
(0.6455)
*** -0.7172 
(0.8797) 
 
Constant -0.9103
(0.3139)
*** -1.3436
(0.5847)
** -1.4686 
(0.4262) 
*** 
Stage2     
Fault -0.3769
(1.6078)
 -0.02752
(1.4305)
 -  
Sever -0.0636
(0.0337)
* -0.0624
(0.0300)
** -  
System -3.0544
(0.9088)
*** -3.0281
(0.8047)
*** -  
Inter 1.6164
(1.8392)
 1.4899
(1.5700)
 -  
Constant 5.588
(2.5996)
** 5.7422
(2.2113)
*** -  
Lambda -2.3077
(1.4969)
 -2.4007
(1.2863)
** -  
     
R2 0.749  0.753  -  
AIC 4.485  4.471  -  
N1=202 (sample size in first stage). 
N2=32 (sample size in second stage). 
Notes: † Base category: neither party appeals. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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An analysis of the results provided by Lee’s model shows that the variable Inter presents a 
significant and positive coefficient in the first stage. This suggests that the non application of 
interest for delay has an influence on the victim’s decision to appeal. The probability of the victim 
bringing an appeal against the ruling increases if the trial court holds that interest for delay in 
payment is not applicable. However, the probability of the insurer bringing an appeal is not 
affected. Likewise, the appeal court does not revise the trial court judgement as to whether the 
insurer is obliged to pay interest in first instance, as indicated by the lack of significance of the 
Inter coefficient in the second stage. Similarly, the variable Fault is only found to have an 
influence on the victim’s decision to appeal. The probability of the victim bringing an appeal 
decreases when the insurer has doubts as to whether the insured driver was fully responsible, but 
neither the behaviour of the insurer or that of the appeal court are influenced by this factor. 
 
The variable Sever shows significant coefficients in both stages. As expected, the probability of 
the victim bringing an appeal is inversely related with the Sever variable (note that the forensic 
examination is a neutral medical evaluation). A positive value for this variable indicates that the 
trial court has, at least partially, taken into consideration the severity of personal injury claimed by 
the victim. Consequently, the victim is less likely to dispute the ruling. The significance of the 
coefficient in the second stage indicates that the appeal court tends to revise the damages 
awarded when the severity of injury stated at first instance does not accord with the forensic 
evaluation. We expected this variable to be positively related to the insurer’s decision to appeal, 
but the lack of significance might reflect imperfect information as the forensic report is not always 
available to the insurer. 
 
An interesting result is noted for the variable System. The negative coefficient reported by the 
insurer’s decision suggests that the insurer is less likely to appeal if the system in force at the time 
of the accident were to be applied in assessing financial compensation. This result is expected 
given that lower amounts are obtained when compensation is considered as a debt of money as 
opposed to a debt of wealth. By contrast, this variable is devoid of any capacity to explain the 
victim’s likelihood of appealing. This result might well reflect insurers’ greater expertise enabling 
them to recognise the application of somewhat obscure standards by trial courts (Santolino, 
2010). This is in accordance with the negative sign of the variable in the second stage, which 
indicates the tendency of the appeal court to consider damages as a debt of money and, 
therefore, to apply the system in force at the time of the accident. Finally, the variable CT shows a 
negative coefficient to explain the victim’s probability of appealing. This indicates that the value of 
the claimant’s decision to appeal depends inversely on the size of the damages awarded. 
 19
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                           Document de Treball   2011/15  pàg. 20 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                           Working Paper             2011/15   pag. 20 
 
 
However, the variable has no influence on the insurer’s behaviour. A plausible explanation here is 
that claimants are relatively more risk averse (Ayuso et al., 2011).  
 
To conclude, a rational litigant will bring an appeal against the trial court’s ruling if the net benefit 
is sufficiently high, i.e. if the probability of revocation is high enough. The insurer’s decision to 
appeal is motivated solely by trial court criteria such as the compensation system that is to be 
applied, given that appeal courts tend to revise this favourably in the second instance. However, 
the victim’s decision to appeal is influenced by factors such as the none application of interest and 
whether there are doubts concerning full responsibility for the accident, factors that are not 
revised by the appeal courts. In short, insurers seem to take more rational appeal decisions than 
those taken by claimants. An explanation for this might lie in the fact that insurers have a better 
understanding of the behaviour of the appeal courts.17  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The ability to identify how appellate courts respond to specific case and environmental 
characteristics can have substantial welfare implications. In examining these, many applied legal 
studies have focused on heterogeneity in individual-specific preferences of appellate courts, 
typically treating the non-randomness of appellate cases as a dichotomous process. This study 
has extended these standard analyses by 1) considering the role of decision-maker effort and 
case complexity, and 2) adopting a multi-categorical selection process of appealed cases where 
each agent (or combination of agents) can have distinct appeal functions and the appeal court 
can respond uniquely to each group of appeals. In order to augment the generalizability of our 
research we have used two distinct legal data sets: customer complaints about monopoly 
conditions in the Swedish electricity distribution sector and car motor injury claims in Spain. We 
have shown that appellate courts are affected by both the effort made by first-stage decision 
makers and by the complexity of the case, which illustrates the value of widening the narrowly 
defined focus on heterogeneity in preferences. We have also shown that appealed cases are a 
non-random sub-sample of litigated cases and that this nature of selectivity is captured more 
effectively using multi-categorical selection models. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 A similar interpretation is given by Ayuso et al. (2011). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics for regulatory and court decisions from the Swedish 
electricity distribution.  
Variable Mean Srd.dev. Min Max 
Stage 1 
(n=337) 
    
UtPri 0.4510 0.4983 0 1 
CustC 0.7092 0.4548 0 1 
ˆ  -1.5×10-6 185.01 -496.28 1740.7 
NoPrec 30.932 24.182 1 143 
Pr/Pu 0.6979 0.2466 0.1600 1.9583 
LengL 266.81 253.35 0 1410 
Ant 0.6979 0.24182 0 1 
Days 4181.0 264.91 2346 4564 
RRevTi 627.97 332.89 34 2196 
     
Stage 2 – Customers appeal 
(n=41) 
    
ˆ  -4.7472 148.66 -496.28 646.97 
CRevTi 304.76 102.03 133 672 
NoPrec 21.610 8.1880 5 61 
ThreeL 0.2439 0.4348 0 1 
DM1 0.7561 0.4348 0 1 
DM2 0.1707 0.3809 0 1 
NoDec 105.66 78.857 1 272 
  
Stage 2 – Utilities appeal 
(n=132) 
 
ˆ  24.627 214.93 -227.65 1740.8 
CRevTi 315.68 110.30 120 994 
NoPrec 24.864 11.044 1 72 
ThreeL 0.4924 0.5018 0 1 
DM1 0.7576 0.4302 0 1 
DM2 0.0985 0.2991 0 1 
NoDec 105.87 81.036 1 276 
  
Stage 2 – Customers and Utilities 
appeal 
(n=60) 
 
ˆ  5.9738 96.345 -323.71 162.97 
CRevTi 314.65 73.492 134 469 
NoPrec 25.967 8.3096 19 68 
ThreeL 0.2500 0.4367 0 1 
DM1 0.9000 0.3025 0 1 
DM2 0.1000 0.3025 0 1 
NoDec 116.58 79.232 3 270 
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Table A2. Regression output from eq. (4).  
Variable a Mean  
(SE) 
 
NoPrec 2.3027
(0.6596)
*** 
UtPri 16.448 
(33.277)
 
ThreeL -34.475 
(33.335)
 
NoDec -0.4217 
(0.1992)
** 
DM1 124.85 
(57.442)
** 
DM2 248.65 
(64.163)
*** 
Ant -3686.7 
(461.24)
*** 
Day -0.2122 
(0.0738)
*** 
Ant×Day 1.0115 
(0.1105)
*** 
Constant 999.34 
(260.22)
*** 
  
R2 0.691 
No. obs. 337 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
a Total regulatory review time (RRevTi) is dependent variable.  
 
 
 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables in the Spanish modelling application 
Variable Mean Srd.dev. Min Max 
Stage 1 
(n=202) 
    
Fault 0.163 0.371 0 1 
Time 1.564 1.0164 0 8 
Sever -1.389 8.367 -86 19 
System 0.480 0.501 0 1 
Comp 8,936 17,037 0 159,747 
Inter 0.158 0.366 0 1 
     
Stage 2 
(n=32) 
    
Fault 0.125 0.336 0 1 
Sever -6.750 18.701 -86 0 
System 0.437 0.504 0 1 
Inter 0.500 0.508 0 1 
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